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The Geopolitics of Interment: An Inquiry into the Burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem, 1931

ABSTRACT

On Friday, 23 January 1931, the prominent Muslim Indian leader Muhammad Ali Jouhar, who died in London on 4 January, was interred in the perimeter of the Jerusalem Haram al-Sharif compound. The article offers a detailed historical analysis of the geopolitics underlying and surrounding the interment of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem. The underlying premise of the investigation is that a large-scale political production, the interment of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem, involved a variety of political actors with particular interests and stakes. In addition to Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti and the Head of the Muslim Supreme Council in British mandate Palestine who initiated and promoted the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem, other major actors included the British Government(s) in London and in Jerusalem. Among the local political actors, the role of the Zionist leadership, most prominently Colonel Fredrick Kisch, head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, was especially awkward. Like the political rivals of the Grand Mufti within Arab-Palestinian society, the Zionist leadership was ostensibly consigned to the role of spectator in an unfolding political play whose script was written by the Grand Mufti and approved by the British Government.

INTRODUCTION

THE POLITICS OF INTERMENT IS CLEARLY EVIDENT IN THE CREATION of national pantheons: cemeteries and burial sites reserved for people of special distinction such as national leaders and heroes. Eligibility for burial

in a specifically designated pantheon is a measure of recognition of merits and acknowledgement of achievements.¹ As this article shows, the formation of such a privileged burial place can also be motivated by geopolitical considerations and amount to a potentially resonant (geo) political statement.

On Friday, 23 January 1931, the prominent Muslim Indian leader Muhammad Ali Jouhar, who died in London on 4 January, was interred in the perimeter of the Jerusalem Haram al-Sharif compound. The burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was initiated and organized by Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the Head of the Muslim Supreme Council in British mandate Palestine. For the Mufti, the burial of the Indian Muslim leader at the Haram was a geopolitical statement designed to augment the position of Al-Quds and the Haram al-Sharif in particular as a revered and relevant pan-Islamic center. It was also a means to garner pan-Islamic solidarity and commitment to the cause of Palestine's Muslims as well as support for the leadership of the Grand Mufti within Arab-Palestinian society. The burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem has been mentioned on the margin of the academic literature dealing with Arab-Muslim politics in British Mandate Palestine.² Making use of Arabic and Hebrew newspapers and British and Zionist archival material, this article offers a detailed historical analysis of the geopolitics underlying and surrounding the interment of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem.

The underlying premise of the historical analysis is that the interment of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was a large-scale political production that involved a variety of political actors with particular interests and stakes. In addition to Amin al-Husayni, who initiated and promoted the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem, other major actors included Shawkat Ali, the brother of the deceased, whose support for Amin al-Husayni's politics was indispensable. They also included the British Government(s) in London and in Jerusalem and in particular Sir John Chancellor, the High Commissioner. Among the local political actors, the role of the Zionist leadership, most prominently Colonel Fredrick Kisch, head of the political department of the Jewish Agency, was especially awkward. Like the political rivals of the Grand Mufti within Arab-Palestinian society, the Zionist leadership was ostensibly consigned to the role of spectator in an unfolding political play whose script was written by the Grand Mufti and approved by the British Government.

THE GEOPOLITICAL BACKGROUND

The interment of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was an act of political propaganda that was firmly aligned with the Mufti's political interests and concerns in a period when, on top of his devotion to the struggle against the Jewish National Home, his politics also included dealing with the growing opposition to his leadership within Arab-Palestinian society, and developing and promoting grand geostrategic visions and schemes.

A centerpiece of the Mufti's struggle against an alleged Zionist threat to Arab Palestine in the late 1920s was the campaign he waged in "defense of Al-Buraq", namely, the effort to assert Muslim control over the Western Wall and to deny the rights of Jews to pray there. Following the anti-Jewish riots in the summer of 1929 the British government of Palestine sought a compromise, while Amin al-Husayni, as Yehushua Porath observes, made a systematic effort to make the defense of Al-Buraq a pan-Islamic cause and thus a source of conflict between the British government and the Muslim world.³ His strategy was to mobilize pan-Muslim solidarity in support of the Arab-Palestinian uncompromising position in regard to the issue of the Western Wall.

The Mufti found Indian Muslims to be particularly supportive of the Arab-Muslim cause in Palestine. India's Muslims constituted the largest Muslim community in the British Empire. Before the era of large scale oil revenues in the Middle East, many in the Arab world looked to India's rich princes and businessmen for financial aid for religious and charitable projects. The engagement of Muslim-Indian leaders was extremely important for al-Husayni because of the financial means they could contribute to defend Arabs' rights in Palestine and the pressure they could exert on the British government in support of the Arab-Muslim cause in Palestine.⁴

Of particular importance for Amin al-Husayni were the ties with and support of the two Indian Muslim brothers Muhammad and Shawkat Ali. Mohammad Ali Jouhar (1878–1931) was a scholar, journalist, poet, and above all a prominent Indian Muslim leader. He and his brother Shawkat led the Indian Khilafat Movement. A pan-Islamic political-religious campaign launched by Muslims in the Raj (British India), the Khalifat Committee formed by Muhammad Ali in 1924 opposed the abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate and sought to unite all Muslims under a re-instituted caliphate. Muhammad Ali was also among the founders and a president of the All-India Muslim League.

The political relationship between Muhammad Ali and Amin al-Husayni began in the early 1920s. In 1922, al-Husayni asked him to send

someone to look after the Indian lodge (Al-Zawiyah al-Hindiyya) in Jerusalem.⁵ In 1922 a Palestinian-Muslim delegation to the Hijaz issued an appeal to "India and other Muslim countries" to help foil what he described as an attempt by the Jews to convert the Al-Aqsa Mosque into a place of worship for Jews.⁶ It was under these circumstances that a three-man Arab-Palestinian delegation headed by Jamal al-Husayni (1892–1982), Secretary of the Palestine Muslim-Christian Association, visited India from November 1923 to June 1924 to collect funds for the renovation of Al-Aqsa. The Mufti met the Ali brothers in Mecca during the pilgrimages of 1924 and 1926.⁷ In 1928 Muhammad Ali visited Palestine and spent 20 hours in Jerusalem. The Mufti appealed to Indian Muslims to support the Arab-Muslim hard-line position in the Muslim struggle to deny Jews the right to pray at the Western Wall. The involvement of Indian Muslims was made apparent in the decision to hold in India a Palestine Day on 16 May 1930.⁸

The Mufti cultivated the Indian-Muslim connection and viewed the Ali brothers' close ties with the British government as advantageous. The cooperation between the brothers and the British government reflected the rift between them and their former ally Gandhi. As leaders of the Muslim minority in the Raj, they did not share the vision of an independent India with a Hindu majority.⁹ The Mufti traveled to Cairo to meet the Ali brothers and members of the Indian-Muslim delegates en route from India to London to participate in the London Round Table Conference for India, which the British government convened in late 1930 to discuss constitutional reforms and the future of India. In his meeting with them the Mufti and Muhammad Ali devised a plan in support of Palestinian Arabs.¹⁰ The Mufti dispatched his aide Jamal al-Husayni to London to keep close ties with the Ali brothers, particularly Shawkat Ali.¹¹

In the Mufti's geopolitical vision, Al-Quds was to become a religious Islamic center of importance for the entire Muslim world and frequented by Muslim pilgrims returning from the *Umra* or *Hajj* rituals of Hijaz. In response to Zionist projects such as the opening of the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus in 1925, the Mufti promoted the opening of an Islamic University in order to upgrade the city's position as a center of Islamic learning. Shawkat Ali supported the idea of making Jerusalem a center of Islam in the framework of the Khalifat movement, since Jerusalem was neutral in relation to different Muslim rulers who potentially entertained the idea of claiming the title of Caliph. For Shawkat Ali, Al-Quds was not to be a seat of the Khalifat, but a center of Islam that would exert influence on the Muslim world. Sharing the vision of Al-Quds as a Muslim center, the Mufti and Shawkat Ali were ostensibly strategic allies.¹²

In contrast to the grandeur of his geopolitical vision and pan-Islamic strategic cooperation with Indian Muslim leaders, in January 1931 the political opposition to the Mufti within Arab-Palestinian society seemed to seriously threaten his position as the president of the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). The opposition accused the Mufti of corruption and charged him with mismanagement of the large *waqf* assets under SMC control as well as other Islamic institutions under his direct control.¹³ For instance, the Mufti was accused of transforming important Muslim cemeteries into development projects.¹⁴ The opposition used the financial crisis of the SMC to call for elections to SMC presidency to depose Amin al-Husayni.

A TALE OF TELEGRAMS

Muhammad Ali died in London aged 53 on 4 January 1931. *The Times* reported the death and Ali's biography as did *Davar* on 5 January. While the *The Times* focused on Ali's Indian politics, *Davar* emphasized his active support for Palestine's Arabs.¹⁵ At first the news about the death of Muhammad Ali seemed of little relevance for the immediate politics of Palestine. As attested in reports in the Arabic and Hebrew press, to a substantial extent Arab-Palestinian politics revolved around the struggle between the Mufti and his opponents over control of the SMC.¹⁶ However, when the burial of Muhammad Ali in the Haram al-Sharif was publicly announced it was commented upon in the Arabic and Hebrew press.

Initially the family thought that Muhammad Ali would be buried in Delhi, where his mother and other members of the Ali family were buried.¹⁷ This was also reported in the press.¹⁸ However, on 9 January *Ha'aretz* reported that he would be buried in Jerusalem.¹⁹ The initiative was the Mufti's, but the cooperation of Shawkat Ali was indispensable for implementing the idea to bury his brother in Jerusalem rather than in India.²⁰

Ostensibly the active involvement of the Mufti began before Muhammad Ali's death. The newspaper *Filastin* reported that on his deathbed Ali received al-Husayni's telegram informing him that thousands of Arab-Palestinians were praying at Al-Aqsa for his recovery and good health. According to the report, Muhammad telegraphed the Mufti expressing his wish that Palestine would be liberated, and the Haram al-Sharif and Al-Buraq would not be harmed.²¹ It is unclear whether this exchange took place, but since it was made public after Muhammad Ali's death, it clearly shows the Mufti's intent to capitalize on Muhammad Ali's reputation and open support for the Arab-Muslim cause in Palestine.




Fig. 1: Scheme of Al-Haram al-Sharif

The journey of Muhammad Ali's coffin to Jerusalem began on 7 January, with a telegram the Mufti sent to London in which he proposed to bury the Indian-Muslim leader in the area of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, "in accordance with his honor and his name in the Muslim world."²² The relatives of the deceased promptly accepted. It is not clear whether the widow had a say. The public face of the family was that of Shawkat Ali. In the telegram he sent in response he accepted the Mufti's proposal: "Muhammad Ali family friends greatly appreciate honor burial Muhammad Ali" near the Al-Aqsa mosque.²³

Two successive Reuter dispatches reporting on the telegram sent by Shawkat Ali to the Mufti told two versions of the same story.²⁴ According to one telegram, the relatives of Muhammad Ali agreed to the Mufti's proposal to bury the Indian-Muslim leader in Jerusalem. This version clearly stated that the initiative was the Mufti's. The other Reuter telegram mentioned that before his death Muhammad Ali had expressed his wish to be buried in the holy precinct.²⁵ According to this version, the Mufti's initiative was a response to an expressed wish of the deceased; in this sense, his burial at the Haram al-Sharif was Muhammad Ali's testament, and his brother and the Mufti were mere implementers of the last wish of the great man. With the exception of the Reuters dispatches there is no evidence that Muhammad Ali pronounced his wish to be buried in the Al-Aqsa mosque. Shawkat Ali's telegram of approval to the Mufti did not make such a bold claim. It merely stated that "Muhammad Ali himself casually mentioned Jerusalem before death."²⁶

As the sovereign power in the land, the British government's consent was a precondition for the endeavor. Without consulting the High Commissioner,²⁷ the British Government in London instructed him on 7 January to facilitate the burial.²⁸ The close ties between the Ali brothers and the British Government implied a favorable reaction of the Colonial Office to Shawkat Ali's a request to bury his brother in Jerusalem, especially if it could be beneficial for the British Government in India. The tensions between the Muslims and the Congress Party in India occasioned sectarian violence. On 5 January riots broke out in Bombay when Muslim militants forced factories and shops to close and stopped buses, cars, and even bicycles.²⁹ The next day riots broke out in Karachi, when Muslims taking part in a memorial procession protested against the Congress flag.³⁰ The possibility that the burial of Muhammad Ali would stir riots in India was real, a fact that suggested that ulterior British motives influenced the British support for the burial in Palestine. The Arabic newspaper *Al-Karmil* addressed prevalent rumors that it was actually the British Government that raised the idea to bury Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem.³¹ It denied British direct involvement, but acquiesced that the decision was beneficial for the British, since "In this grave moment it prevented large demonstrations in India that would have erupted during the funeral of Muhammad Ali there." According to *al-Karmil*, "That is why the government will no doubt value this service rendered by Haj Amin al-Husayni and will reward him by respecting the rights of the Arabs in Palestine."

The burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was approved by the British Government on 7 January. In his telegram to the Mufti, Shawkat Ali reported that the coffin would be sent on board the steamer *Narkunda*, due

in Port Said, Egypt, on 21 January. A large reception was planned to take place at the port.³² From Port Said the coffin would be sent to Jerusalem by train, arriving on Friday 23 January. However, for all involved, the funeral was but the culmination of a process that included issues of protocol and planning regarding the design of the gravesite and the conduct of the funeral procession. Notably it also involved the propaganda campaign run by the Mufti and his acolytes intended to influence Arab public opinion to garner political capital.

On the background of the bitter struggle between the Mufti and his opponents in the SMC, the forthcoming funeral of the Indian-Muslim leader in Jerusalem increasingly gained in public resonance through reports in the Arabic and Hebrew press about the deceased, the political circumstances of his burial in Palestine, and preparations for the burial ceremony on Friday 23 January. The planning involved the construction of the gravesite and the organization of the funeral procession and rites. The SMC appointed a special committee to make the arrangements for the burial ceremony.³³

SETTING THE AGENDA: THE MUFTI'S PERSPECTIVE

On Friday 9 January prayers in memory of Muhammad Ali were recited in mosques throughout Palestine. Many Muslim dignitaries attended the prayer at Al-Aqsa. The preacher, Sheikh Sa'd al-Din al-Khatib, praised the contribution of the deceased to Islam and to the cause of Arab Palestine.³⁴

For the Mufti, the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was a measure of political propaganda. The SMC organ *Al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya* was a major conduit of the Mufti's propaganda campaign. The message was clear and simple—the burial in Jerusalem was a token of gratitude to the great Muslim-Indian leader who unequivocally supported the Mufti in his relentless struggle against alleged Zionist threats to Muslim Holy shrines. On 8 January the paper reported that the Ali brothers were about to organize a Pan-Islamic conference in London to defend the cause of Arab Palestine and in particular, Muslim ownership of the Western Wall.³⁵

Praises for the Ali brothers and directing attention to the geopolitical importance of the burial of Muhammad Ali reflected positively on their ally Amin al-Husayni. In his reporting about the deceased and the preparation for the funeral, *Al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya* cultivated the image of the Mufti as a leader capable of "great deeds" in the arena of international Muslim politics. On 8 January it reported that the Muslim Committee of Haifa, which

stood in opposition to al-Husayni, sent a telegram to Shawkat Ali and to the Indian Khilafa Movement, stating that Haifa Arabs were deeply moved by the death of Ali, known for his efforts to “save Palestine from its current situation” and “his activity to expand Islamic solidarity in India regarding the holy places in Palestine.”

Whereas *Al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya* was a vehicle of the Mufti's propaganda, positive reports in other Arabic newspapers were significant in that they clearly evidenced the extent to which the Mufti was successful in setting the agenda. The Haifa newspaper *al-Karmil* wrote that the Mufti's initiative was a fair reward to the family of Muhammad Ali, and that his burial in Al-Aqsa would strengthen the ties between seventy million Indian Muslims and Al-Aqsa and Palestine, and would further serve as a precedent for other Muslim leaders who would ask to be buried there.³⁶ In a similar vein, the newspaper *Mira'at al-Sharq*, which was close to the opposition to the Mufti, commented that

The enlightened ones are of the opinion that this great deed is a first step for more great deeds. Many Muslim leaders will ask to be buried close to the Haram al-Sharif. In this manner the connection between the Muslim world and Palestine will be enhanced and the strength of the resistance to the Zionist movement will be augmented.³⁷

The commentary did not suggest anything new or original that had not already been discussed in the Arab press. However, it clearly implied that the opposition to the Mufti complied with the agenda set by him.

On 12 January the SMC discussed preparations for the funeral; notably no issues pertaining to the conflict between the Mufti and the Opposition were deliberated.³⁸ In the period leading to the funeral the opposition to the Mufti in the SMC kept a low profile. The opposition newspaper *Mira'at al-Sharq* explained that the conflict was not over, but the opposition postponed involving the government in the conflict within the SMC until after the funeral.³⁹ According to a Jewish commentator, the Mufti's rivals in the SMC were aware of the Mufti's obvious political gains, but they were also aware that Arab public opinion in Palestine was firmly behind and unconditionally supportive of the Mufti's initiative and its anti-Zionist message.⁴⁰ This was evident in commentaries in Arab newspapers that hailed the Mufti for his endeavor. Hyperbolic language was not the exception to the rule. After the funeral *Filastin* wrote: “The Al-Quds Mufti's initiative to bury Muhammad Ali here is inspired by God who wished to wrap Jerusalem with millions to help her in her hour of anguish caused by world Jewry.”⁴¹

THE GRAVESITE

It is not clear whether al-Husayni had a specific site when he offered to inter Muhammad Ali close to al-Aqsa. The sanctity of the Haram entailed setting a boundary between the holy and the defiled. The Madrasa al-Khatuniyya bordering the western wall of the Haram offered an appropriate burial site. The Madrasa is located on the Western arcade of the Haram to the north of Suq al-Qattanin and south of the Madrasa Arghuniyya and the Iron Gate. It was donated and built in 1354 as a Madrasa, but it seems that it never operated as a religious seminary but rather as a residence for distinguished pilgrims.⁴² In modern times it was known as Dar al-Khatib because the building was under the custodianship of the Khatib family waqf. It is a two-story building with an open courtyard. The part that was used for burial already contained in its ground floor a domed tomb chamber (probably Ughul Khatun's grave without a remaining inscription)⁴³ with an anteroom to its north and an assembly/prayer room with a *mihrab* to its south. Only this part of the building was allocated as a burial site.

The agreement between the SMC and the Khatib family was reached on 12 January.⁴⁴ The burial chamber is situated above the western wall of the Haram and against the Foundation Stone (inside the Dome of the Rock). The area of the Madrasa allocated for burial is 56 sqm; the floor and tombstone are made of marble.⁴⁵ The tombstone was shaped in the traditional form of tombs of Muslim holy men.⁴⁶ The SMC took upon itself to make an opening between the Mosque's courtyard and the burial room and agreed that the family would retain forever the keys to this door.⁴⁷ The doors and windows to the open courtyard on its western side were blocked while a window to the East (to the Haram) was rendered into the only door and entrance.⁴⁸ Since the door key was in the hands of the family waqf, regular visitors can see the tomb of Muhammad Ali only through the window.

THE MANDATE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE

The High Commissioner met separately with the Mufti and the Zionist leaders. Constrained by the policy decided upon in London, these meetings gave Chancellor an opportunity to convey his suggestions, recommendations, and concerns to the major political players in the local arena and by so doing, to safeguard British interests.




Fig. 2: Scheme of Madrasa Khatuniyya

According to the directive from London, the Mandate Government took steps to support the endeavor. The head of the Health Department visited the SMC and conferred with the Mufti. He also paid a visit to the burial site. The railway authority was also engaged and discussed transport possibilities and prices with the Mufti. As a token of good will, in their meeting on 13 January, Chancellor informed the Mufti that he would place his personal coach at the disposal of the family for the train journey to Jerusalem.⁴⁹

Notwithstanding practical issues such as public health and transportation, of much concern for the Mandate Government was maintaining public safety. The memory of the 1929 Arab riots was still fresh. The capacity for violence was real since the funeral could be used a vehicle for expressing Muslim grievances and Arab resentment against the Jewish National Home and the British administration. The responsibility lay with the High Commissioner. Aware of the potential for violence, Chancellor needed the cooperation of the Mufti to ensure that the burial would be conducted

peacefully. On 15 January the Head of Police met with the Mufti to discuss funeral arrangements.⁵⁰ In his dispatch to London, Chancellor related that the Mufti assured him that “speeches and songs would not be permitted as the funeral procession passed through the streets.”⁵¹ Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, reported to the Cabinet on 21 January that the Government of Palestine was taking “every possible precaution” to prevent communal violence in Palestine.⁵²

THE POLITICS OF INVITATIONS

As a major political production, the list of invited guests attending the burial ceremony was a powerful message. Of much political significance is not only those invited, but also those who were not. According to one report the SMC issued 5,000 invitations to “dignitaries and consuls, religious leaders, high-ranking government officials,” as well as to Muslim and Arab associations and clubs.⁵³ Invitations were sent to Arab dignitaries in neighboring Arab countries: the Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan and the Prime Ministers of Egypt and Syria. Another Arab source reported that 10,000 invitations to the funeral of Muhammad Ali were sent, wherein the Mufti hailed the deceased as “the supreme symbol of relentless effort and self-sacrifice of his spirit and property for the cause of Islam in general and in favor of the Arab-Palestinian cause in particular.”⁵⁴ Notably, no invitations were issued to the Chief Rabbis or to leaders of the Jewish *Yishuv*.⁵⁵

The Mufti’s handling of the list of invited guests irked the opposition. A critical report published after the funeral in *Mira’at al-Sharq* specified the “mistakes” by the funeral committee appointed by and associated with the Mufti’s acolytes in the SMC.⁵⁶ It reported that the Mufti intentionally refrained from inviting people identified with the opposition, thereby making the funeral ceremony a factional issue. Those not invited included Arab mayors who were identified with the opposition to the Mufti, and members of the Arab Executive Committee who did not belong to the Mufti’s faction. Criticism in Ramallah directed at the funeral committee was that it “discounted the people of this city”.

Another matter was issuing invitations to government officials and members of the consular corps in Palestine. The Mufti consulted and followed the advice of the High Commissioner.⁵⁷ In an answer to a direct question, Chancellor informed the Mufti that he would not accept an invitation to attend the funeral, and that he would be represented by a member of his staff. He also urged the Mufti to send invitations to government

officers. Chancellor suggested that instead of going to the railway station and taking part in the procession, government representatives should attend the ceremony at the Haram, in a special enclosure prepared for this purpose. The Mufti concurred with this suggestion.

In a response to the Mufti's enquiry whether the consular corps should be invited to attend, the High Commissioner told him that "he should do so and that they would [be] hurt if they did not receive an invitation." He also opined that the Consuls should be treated as members of the Government. Encouraged by the High Commissioner's support, the Mufti contacted the Doyen of the Consular Corps, Dr. Erich Nord, the Consul General of Germany, who recommended to the Mufti to send invitations to the Consular Corps. The Mufti arranged with him that the Consuls would welcome the coffin in the Railway Station and join the funeral procession on its way to the Haram. However, a number of consuls, most prominently the American Consul General, declined to participate in the funeral procession which they considered "as being more of a political demonstration than a religious ceremony."⁵⁸

THE ZIONIST RESPONSE (I)—BEHIND THE SCENES

In an article published in the organ of the Zionist movement *Ha'Olam* a month after the burial of Muhammad Ali, the author claimed that in principle, the Zionist movement considered Jerusalem and other holy sites as a special realm that was essentially different from "political and economic areas of the country."⁵⁹ The author argued that preserving the full rights of every religion to its holy sites should be a guiding political principle for the government. He further claimed that the Zionist movement practiced a policy of "neutral tolerance" in regard to the activities pursued by religious leaders in the holy places under their control—unless these activities infringed on the religious rights of Jews, and provided that they were not explicitly political. According to the author, Jerusalem was a holy city for the three religions, and the custom of burying distinguished religious and even national figures in holy sites could be accepted in principle; in his opinion, however, the burial of Muhammad Ali was different in that it was a "dramatic political episode" that combined politics and religion.

Though not apparent in the reports in the Hebrew press, the Zionist leadership was concerned about the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem. On 9 January, Kisch and Pinhas Rutenberg, the head of the *Vá'ad Leumi*, met separately with the High Commissioner to discuss the burial

of Muhammad Ali. The Zionist leaders claimed that the Mufti's initiative was "solely for political reasons", and expressed their fear that Muhammad Ali's tomb would become "a shrine which would be used as an instrument for rousing the fanaticism of Moslems in connection with the Wailing Wall."⁶⁰ Zionist leaders were concerned that the funeral would ignite violence. Chancellor assured them that "Every precaution would be taken to ensure that the funeral went off without incident." He suggested advising Jews "to keep out of sight while the procession was passing."⁶¹ He did not tell his interlocutors what he confided to Passfield, that he hoped that if the funeral would not stir up violence, "the presence of the tomb would soon be forgotten."⁶²

The Zionist leaders pressed the High Commissioner to urge his Majesty's Government to withdraw the permission. Chancellor explained that it was impossible to cancel the permission, and that such a move would mean a grave offence to the entire Muslim world. This was the only reference to British interests in the Muslim world. The Zionist leaders told Chancellor that they would telegraph the Jewish Agency in London to petition HMG to withdraw the permission. Notably, two days after the meeting members of the Jewish community in Cairo sent a telegram to the Colonial Office in London and to the High Commissioner in Jerusalem protesting the burial in the Temple area:

The Jewish community in Cairo received with surprise the news of the burial of the Indian Muhammad Ali in the area of Solomon's Temple, as such burial adversely reflects upon the dignity of the world Jewry in their holy places and is a challenge to the Jews' national awakening. In the name of the Community we protest against such burial and persistently request Your Excellency to prevent it, as it would arouse the wrath of all the Jewish people.⁶³

It is not clear who was behind the telegram. In an emergency meeting of the Zionist leadership in Palestine held a few days later Kisch criticized the telegram to which he referred as a "strange thing" and added that he sent Zionist representatives "a strong letter" warning them not to do something like that again.⁶⁴ Clearly the telegram's tough language was in stark contrast to the cautious language used by the Zionist leaders when they met with Chancellor. Once leaked, it was a propaganda fodder for the Mufti's newspaper: "The Zionists . . . trespassed every boundary, thinking that they can prevent the Muslims in the country to hold a burial ceremony of a great Muslim leader in Dar al-Islam [Muslim soil]." It called upon the Egyptian Muslims "to teach these petitioners a lesson they will never forget."⁶⁵

The aforementioned telegram of protest was not meant for public consumption. Notably the only public condemnation in the Hebrew press of the burial as an affront to Jewish claims to the holy compound was expressed by the poet Uri Zvi Greenberg after the burial. Unlike Kisch, Greenberg was not bound by the constraints of public office. In a casual reference to the burial in an article directed against the Zionist leadership and its ostensible incompetence, the militant revisionist poet renounced the “political burial in the Temple Mount” that “sanctified the place by the burial of a corpse”.⁶⁶ For Greenberg, the Temple Mount’s essential sanctity was exclusively embedded in the House of David and the vision of the restored Kingdom of Israel.

Kisch did not mention the sanctity of the Temple Mount for Jews as an argument against the burial of Muhammad Ali. However, he informed Chancellor that it was contrary to Shari’a Law to bury Muslims outside a cemetery (in his report to Passfield Chancellor mentioned that according to his information, this was not the case).⁶⁷ The only reference to the holiness of the Temple Mount for Jews was in a response to the High Commissioner’s suggestion made in their meeting on 16 January to facilitate an invitation for some Jewish leaders to the funeral “to promote improvement of the relations between Arabs and Jews.”⁶⁸ A day later Kisch informed him that “leading Rabbis” would not accept such an invitation because it was contrary to Jewish law: a visit to the Temple Mount entailed the danger of treading upon the Holy of Holies, which was strictly forbidden for Jews.⁶⁹

While discussing the invitations with Chancellor, Kisch confided the intention to reinter Herzl in Jerusalem. He referred to a resolution of the Zionist executive from September 1925 to reinter Herzl in Palestine.⁷⁰ The idea was prompted by the re-interment of the Zionist leader and famed writer Max Nordau at Tel-Aviv’s cemetery in May 1926, which was initiated and carried out by the Tel-Aviv Municipality. Kisch mentioned the intention to bury Herzl in Jerusalem as an argument against the idea of issuing invitations to Jewish leaders to attend the funeral of Muhammad Ali. He was sure that “in view of the attitude of Arabs toward Zionism . . . the Jews would not issue invitations to the leading Arabs to be present at that ceremony.”⁷¹ Chancellor consented not to raise the issue with the Mufti. In his report to London he speculated that the Mufti would not have enthusiastically agreed to invite Jews to the funeral because “[H]e would thereby expose himself to hostile criticisms by his political opponents.”⁷²

At the end of his meeting with Chancellor on 17 January Kisch expressed his fear that the precedent created by the burial of Muhammad

Ali at the Haram al-Sharif would result in converting the Haram “into a mausoleum for prominent Muslim leaders”, which would make it a “center of political and religious propaganda”.⁷³ In his diary he reiterated his concern in regard to the Mufti’s intent to make the Haram a burial place for Muslim leaders “with no relationship whatsoever with Palestine”.⁷⁴ In his response to Kisch, Chancellor claimed that in his view the burial of Muhammad Ali would not “add greatly to the sanctity of the Haram al-Sharif in the eyes of the Muslims”, since the site was already regarded by Muslims to be “only less sacred than Mecca and Medina.”⁷⁵

THE ZIONIST RESPONSE (II)—GOING PUBLIC

The official Zionist policy formulated and pursued by Kisch was to avoid open criticism of Muhammad Ali’s burial in Jerusalem. He opted for caution. As he noted in his diary, “At this time there is no place for public criticism by Jews.”⁷⁶ He limited his concerns to his diary and to his confidential talks with the High Commissioner. He was aware that the Mufti’s propaganda campaign could only benefit from open criticism of the burial. However, as the case of the telegram sent by Zionists in Egypt showed, an official policy of non-belligerence in public was hostage to the compliance of Zionist activists and pundits of different ideological colors with a policy that had never been openly discussed and never proclaimed.

The impracticality of Kisch’s policy of public non-belligerence was clearly evidenced when the weekly English edition of *Davar*, the Histadrut paper, published an editorial critical of the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem.⁷⁷ *Davar* was considered a mouthpiece not only of Labor Zionism, but of the Jewish Yishuv. As *Filastin* made clear, “*Davar* speaks for the majority of the Jews in Palestine.”⁷⁸ From an Arab perspective the editorial was the smoking gun: the proof that the Zionists/Jews, “angry since the grave will unite Palestine and the Muslim world,”⁷⁹ were against the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem.

For Kisch, the editorial that had rendered Jewish objections public was a mistake that caused substantial damage; in his view, there was an urgent need to “repair” the mistake that “put us in a grave situation.”⁸⁰ Kisch wrote an angry letter to *Davar*,⁸¹ but this did not change the fact that the editorial was a liability. George Antonius, a Lebanese-Egyptian author and diplomat who lived in Jerusalem, and according to Kisch “a crony of the Mufti”, mentioned the editorial when they met. Kisch told Antonius that it was a misunderstanding, and in any case the editorial did not represent

the “Jewish position” since “We respect Muhammad Ali who also was close to the Zionists and we know him and appreciate him.”⁸²

Aware that public expression of Zionist objections to the funeral would only serve the Mufti’s propaganda, Kisch realized that the best way to avoid a “lose-lose” situation was to offer public condolences to Shawkat Ali, while ignoring the Mufti altogether. Chaim Weizmann informed Kisch that he had met Shawkat Ali in London before he embarked on the journey with the coffin to Palestine, and Shawkat Ali assured him that his intent was friendly and he wanted to assist in bolstering peace in the land. Weizmann suggested sending a telegram to Shawkat Ali in Port Said to remind him of the conversation they had had. As suggested, Kisch and Ruppin sent a telegram on behalf of the Executive of the Jewish Agency to Shawkat Ali:

As you approach Palestine, the Executive of the Jewish Agency conveys to you our heartfelt condolences on the passing of your brother with the hope that the transferal of his body to his last resting place, the exalted character of his soul will inspire peace and cooperation between Muslims and Jews in the land.⁸³

The Mufti’s organ was not impressed by the gesture of goodwill. After mentioning the surprise that condolences were conveyed, the newspaper asserted that the “Zionists would have done anything they could to prevent bringing the coffin to the country”, and if they only could, “they would have withheld bread and water from the Muslims.”⁸⁴ After congratulating Kisch for the deed, *Filastin* expressed the hope “[T]hat the Jews indeed realized what the human obligation towards the dead is.”⁸⁵

However, Kisch felt that for the sake of its impact on Arab public opinion, this telegram needed to be complemented by a public expression of condolences on behalf of the entire Yishuv. For this purpose he summoned an urgent joint meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, the Executive of the *Va’ad Leumi*, *Agudat Israel*, and members of the Council of the *Lishka Meuhedet*.⁸⁶ The meeting took place on 21 January in Jerusalem, two days before the funeral. The number and rank of those attending testified to the importance ascribed to this meeting and to its resolution(s), which were supposed to represent the entire Jewish Yishuv and hence the widest consensus possible.⁸⁷

Kisch opened the discussion with his version of events and a proposed text for the telegram. Speakers concurred with Kisch’s assertion that *Davar*’s editorial was “a mistake (that) put us in a grave situation.”⁸⁸ Ben-Zvi opined that it was a tactical mistake, but pointed out that the paper expressed the

editors' views only, and did not represent the official view of the Executive of the Jewish Agency and the *Va'ad Leumi*. Yitzhak Elishar, a former deputy mayor of Jerusalem argued that an apology for the publication of the article was appropriate. As to the telegram, the idea to send a condolences telegram on behalf of the Yishuv was accepted in principle by all speakers. The text of the telegram read:

On the eve of the arrival of the body of Mawlana Muhammad Ali to Palestine we want to express our deep sympathy with the family of the deceased and Muslims all over the globe for their big loss. The Jews of Palestine convey their condolences to the deceased leader's co-religionists who accompany him to his grave and to the Muslims in Palestine who mourn him.⁸⁹

To make an impact on Arab public opinion, the telegram of condolences on behalf of the Yishuv was sent to Arab newspapers. *Al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya* printed the telegram in a prominent place, with no comment attached to it; *Filastin* printed the telegram, but added that it was out of politeness, and its credibility could not be assured.⁹⁰ In a commentary published two days later *Filastin* stated that the telegram of condolences was a mere "political lie", since the editorial in *Davar* proved that the "Jews" were against the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem.⁹¹ Further, it reported that when Shawkat Ali waved to the crowds, without making a distinction between Arabs and non-Arabs, everyone present with the exception of the "Jews" responded by taking their hats off. This was proof that the "Jews" approved of the aforementioned editorial of *Davar*.

In contradistinction, Shawakt Ali sent a letter to Kisch in which he expressed appreciation for the attitude of the Executive towards his brother's funeral. He also invited Kisch for a meeting. The meeting took place on 8 February, but as Kisch wrote in his diary, the presence of the secretary assigned to Shawkat Ali by the Mufti rendered candid and open conversation and exchange of ideas between the two impossible.⁹² Weizmann's idea was to use the telegram to remind Shawkat Ali of their meeting in London. The telegram did not entail such a reminder, but evidently Shawkat Ali did not forget his meeting with Weizmann. In a speech he held in Jaffa to members of the Muslim-Christian Association the day before his meeting with Kisch he mentioned that he had met Weizmann in London since he wanted to help in peace-making.⁹³ He told his audience that only when he came to Palestine did he realize how vast Arab hatred of Jews was, hatred that was the result of Jewish politics. In his opinion in order to achieve peace, the Jews should change their political course.

THE FUNERAL

In a public announcement issued the day before the funeral the Mufti encouraged Palestine Arabs to take part in the funeral and to preserve public order.⁹⁴ As planned, on Friday 23 January, a sunny winter day, the coffin of Muhammad Ali arrived at Jerusalem's central railway station. Covered with a green cloth adorned with Qur'an verses, the coffin was placed in a special van. The funeral procession moved to Damascus Gate, headed by mounted police. Following a group singing a funeral chant, groups of young men carrying banners, wreaths, and images of the deceased preceded the coffin. Shawkat Ali and the Mufti marched behind the coffin. The widow, accompanied by representatives of Arab women's organizations, watched the funeral procession from the balcony of the post office. The route was secured by the police. Upon arriving at the Damascus Gate, the funeral procession entered the Old City. According to the official report, the streets were filled by "an orderly crowd" moving in the direction of the Haram.⁹⁵

The representatives of the Government saluted the coffin upon entering the Haram and then, together with Heads of Christian communities, joined the procession immediately behind the coffin. Members of the consular corps joined the procession at the bottom of the steps leading to the Dome of the Rock. The procession halted upon reaching the northern door of the Dome of the Rock, where Shawkat Ali acknowledged the salutes of the crowds. After shaking hands with him and the Mufti, the official representatives left the Haram, while the procession entered the Dome of the Rock and the coffin was carried to the designated burial place.

The Mufti agreed that no speeches were held on the streets, but this restriction obviously did not apply to the precincts of the Haram. Repeating familiar motives, the eulogies delivered there rendered the anti-Zionist message of the burial explicit.⁹⁶ The list of speakers conveyed a message of pan-Arab and pan-Islamic solidarity: these were representatives of Islamic associations and organizations in Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria. A Christian-Arab poet read a poem composed especially for the funeral.

A clear statement about his unique function in the event and his claim to position of supreme leadership, the Mufti was not only the first to eulogize, but also the only Palestinian-Muslim leader to deliver a eulogy. Among other eulogists were the famous Egyptian Pan-Arab philologist Ahmad Zaki Pasha, who presented Muhammad Ali as a Holy martyr of Jihad (*shahid*) and the Tunisian nationalist leader in exile Abdelaziz Tha'alibi.⁹⁷

The fissures in the demonstration of unity were manifest in terms of absence. Raghib al-Nashashibi, the Mayor of Jerusalem and a prominent



Fig 3: Muhammad Ali's Gravestone

leader of the opposition to the Mufti, did not attend, the official explanation being that he was ill. Mussa Kazim al-Husayni, head of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress, stayed in his hometown of Jericho. The absence of the High Commissioner was not related to the struggle between the Mufti and the opposition. It was a matter of policy, which was made clear to the Mufti in their meeting on 17 January. Officially his absence was due to illness.

CONCLUSIONS

A poem published in *Filastin* on the day Muhammad Ali was buried praised the casket, which “engaged the world and its inhabitants” as the “the hero of Islam . . . the hero of justice with many supporters”. The pathos was expressed in hyperbolic language designed to emphasize the greatness of the deceased and the importance of his funeral. The poem focused on the casket rather on Muhammad Ali himself: indeed, it was the casket and its journey to Jerusalem that was at the center of the large-scale geo-political production master-minded by Haj Amin al-Husayni, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.

The burial in Jerusalem was much more than a mere religious rite. Conceived of as a political production and designed by the Mufti as a means of political propaganda, a relevant question is whether the Mufti could consider the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem a success. Obviously this is a matter of interpretation and ideological point of view. The Mufti himself did not refer to the issue in public.

According to *Filastin*, 100,000 attended the funeral.⁹⁸ The Jewish press was skeptical. According to *Davar* the funeral did not attract much attention in neighboring countries and the number of those who attended the funeral was small.⁹⁹ However, the report conceded that the funeral was “an impressive religious demonstration”. The *Palestine Bulletin*, on the other hand, wrote that “the procession . . . was drab” and noted that “Comparatively few cared to pay him (Muhammad Ali) their last respect.”¹⁰⁰ From the perspective of the Government the funeral was a success since its conduct was peaceful. This was the main issue for the British Mandate administration. Of course, the dignified manner in which the funeral was conducted reflected on the Mufti, who demonstrated that he was a reliable partner of the Government, when it was in his interest.

However, success was also a function of the (geo)political impact of the burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem. The opposition to the Mufti in the SMC was silenced. The Arab-Palestinian press enthusiastically supported the Mufti’s initiative. Echoing a theme celebrated in the Arab press, *Doar Ha’yom* conceded that “The burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem established a spiritual link between Palestinian Muslims and their brethren in India.”¹⁰¹ The underlying issue was the struggle against the Jewish National Home. In Arab public opinion, the burial in Jerusalem was a decisive blow to Zionism: the aforementioned commentary in *Doar Ha’yom* quotes a young Arab leader in Beirut as stating: “When we buried Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem we also buried your Zionism.”

The burial of Muhammad Ali in Jerusalem was but the first stage in the Mufti's strategic design to transform Jerusalem into an Arab-Muslim center. Kisch was concerned about the Mufti's intention to make the Haram al-Sharif "a mausoleum for prominent Muslim leaders."¹⁰² The Mufti's next strategic move in this direction was the burial of the Sharif Husayn Ibn Ali in the vicinity of Muhammad Ali's gravesite following the death of the founder of the Hashemite dynasty in June 1931. According to a commentary in *Davar*, "The burial of Muhammad Ali and Sharif Husayn fortified the position of the Mufti for the time being; it created important political connections and it laid the foundation for the future Muslim center in Jerusalem."¹⁰³

In December 1931 the pan-Islamic congress organized by the Mufti and Shawkat Ali convened in Jerusalem. As a display of pan-Islamic solidarity and support for the cause of Palestinian Arabs, the congress buttressed the leadership position of the Mufti and his ambitious plans for Jerusalem. However, with the exception of creating a pan-Muslim and pan-Arab pantheon in Jerusalem, the Mufti's grand design for the creation of "an Islamic center" in the city did not materialize. As fund-raising failed, the Islamic college envisioned by the Mufti was not built.

Notably the idea to create a Zionist pantheon in Jerusalem promoted by Menachem Ussishkin materialized in 1934 when the mortal remains of the Zionist leader Leo Pinsker (1821–1891) were interred at the Cave of Nicanor on Mount Scopus. Following the 1948 War, Mount Scopus was an Israeli exclave and could not be further developed as a Zionist pantheon. In August 1949 the mortal remains of Herzl were reinterred on a hilltop in western Jerusalem. Mount Herzl, as the hill was officially named, became Israel's national cemetery, a distinguished Zionist pantheon belonging to the symbolic and ceremonial fabric of Jewish statehood.

Hidden behind closed doors and devoid of ritual functions, the Muslim-Arab pantheon created by the Mufti at the outskirts of the Haram has not become a notable feature of the holy area dominated by the Dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque. Remarkably, the High Commissioner proved to be far sighted when, in his meeting with Colonel Kisch on 9 January, he expressed his hope that "if the funeral went off quietly the presence of the tomb would soon be forgotten."

NOTES

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1. On gravesites and burials of Great Wo/Men see Maoz Azaryahu, "Mount Herzl: The Creation of Israel's National Cemetery," *Israel Studies* 1.2 (1996): 46–74; Avner Ben Amos, *Funerals, Politics and Memory in Modern France 1789–1996* (Oxford, 2000).

2. Uri M. Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council, Islam under the British Mandate for Palestine* (Leiden, 1987), 192; Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion* (London, 1977), 8–13; Ilan Pappé, *Aristocracy of the Land: The Husayni Family. Political Biography* (Jerusalem, 2002), 280 [Hebrew].

3. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab Movement*, 13.

4. *Do'ar HaYom*, 31 September 1931, 1.

5. Omar Khalidi "Indian Muslims and Palestinian Waqf," *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 40 (2009–10): 52–8.

6. Sandeep Chawla, "The Palestine Issue in India Politics in 1920s," in *Communal and Pan-Islamic Trends in Colonial India*, ed. Mushirul Hasan (New Delhi, 1981), 29, quoted by Khalidi, "Indian Muslims and Palestinian Waqf," n.4.

7. Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council*, 193–4.

8. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab Movement*, 9.

9. *Ibid.*, 15.

10. *Ha'aretz*, 11 January 1931, 1.

11. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab Movement*, 9.

12. *Davar*, 11 September 1931, 5.

13. *Davar*, "The Battle between the Mufti and the Opposition," 15 January 1931, 2.

14. Yitzhak Reiter, *Allah's Safe Haven?: The Controversy Surrounding the Mamilla Cemetery and the Museum of Tolerance, Contesting Domination over the Symbolic and Physical Landscapes* (Jerusalem, 2011), 112–23 [Hebrew].

15. *The Times*, 18; *Davar*, 5 January, 1931, 1.

16. *Ha'aretz*, 4 January, 1 and 5 January 1931, 1.

17. NAUK (National Archives United Kingdom), FO 371/15330 (FCO 141/2445) Telegram, Shawkat Ali to Amin al-Husayni, 8 January 1931.

18. *Ha'aretz*, 8 January 1931, 2; *Filastin* reported that the family was informed that the Government would finance the transfer of the coffin to India, 9 January 1931.

19. *Ha'aretz*, 9 January 1931, 1.

20. Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 9.

21. *Filastin*, 6 January 1931.
22. *Ha'aretz*, 11 January 1931, 1.
23. NAUK, Shawkat Ali to Amin al-Husayni, 8 January 1931.
24. *Filastin*, 11 January 1931; *Ha'aretz*, 12 January 1931, 2.
25. *Ha'aretz*, 9 January, 1; *Palestine Bulletin*, 9 January 1931, 1.
26. *Al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya*, 11 January 1931, 3.
27. The High Commissioner admitted to that in his meeting with Colonel Fredrick Kisch, head of the political department of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem on 9 January, Fredrick H. Kisch, *Palestine Diary* (Jerusalem, 1939), 401 [Hebrew].
28. In his telegram to Mufti Amin al-Husayn, Shawkat Ali wrote that the British Government cabled the High Commissioner asking him to give every facility needed. See also *Ha'aretz*, 12 January 1931, 1.
29. *Filastin*, 10 January 1931.
30. *The Times*, 7 January; *Filastin*, 9 January 1931.
31. Reported in *Davar*, 29 January 1931, 1.
32. *Filastin*, 22 January 1931.
33. *Ha'aretz*, 15 January 1931, 1.
34. *Al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya*, 11 January 1931, 3.
35. *Ibid.*, 8 January 1931, 2.
36. *Ha'aretz*, 16 January. See also *Palestine Bulletin*, 16 January 1931, 1.
37. Cited in *Ha'aretz*, 18 January 1931.
38. *Davar*, 13 January 1931, 1.
39. Cited in *Davar*, 19 January 1931, 4.
40. *Ha'Olam*, no. 6, "Politics and Holiness," 10 February 1931, 120.
41. *Filastin*, 24 January 1931.
42. Michael Hamilton Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem* (Jerusalem, 1987), 343.
43. Ughul Khatun al-Qazaniyya al-Baghdadiyya, probably the wife of Amir Qazan Shah. The endowment was expanded later in 1380 by her daughter Isfahan. On the building and its history see "Khatuniyya Madrasa" at http://archnet.org/library/sites/one-site.jsp?site_id=7899 citing the following sources: Kamil J. Asali, *Jerusalem in History: 3000 B.C. to the Present Day* (London & New York, 1997), 189–91; Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, 343–55; Ra'if Yusuf Najm, ed., *Kunuz al-Quds* (Milan, 1983), 247–8; Al-Ulaymi, Mujir al-Din, *Al uns al-jalil bi-tarikh al Quds wa'l-Khalil* (Amman, 1973), 32 [Arabic]; Al-Umari, Ahmad Ibn Yahya, and Kamil al-Jaburi, eds., *Masalik al-absar fi mamalik al-amsar* (Beirut, 2010), 161 [Arabic].
44. *Davar*, 13 January 1931, 1.
45. *Filastin*, 13 January, 2; *Ha'aretz*, 14 January 1931, 1.
46. *Davar*, 22 January 1931, 1.
47. *Ibid.*
48. See Burgoyne, *Mamluk Jerusalem*, Figure 31.3.
49. *Ha'aretz*, 15 January 1931, 1.
50. *Ibid.*, 18 January 1931, 1.
51. NAUK, Dispatch, Chancellor to Passfield, 24 January 1931, 3.

52. NAUK, Cabinet Minutes, 21 January 1931.
53. *Ha'aretz*, 15 January 1931, 1.
54. *Davar*, 22 January 1931, 1.
55. *Al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya*, *Davar*, 16 January, 4; 22 January 1931, 1.
56. *Davar*, 29 January 1931, 4.
57. UKNA, Chancellor to Passfield, Report on the meeting with the Mufti, 17 and 24 January 1931, 4.
58. UKNA, Chancellor to Passfield, 24 January 1931, 4.
59. *Ha'Olam*, "Political Association," 3 February 1931, 90.
60. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, 17 January 1931, 1–2.
61. *Ibid.*
62. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield 17 January 1931, 2.
63. NAUK, Isaac Loewi, Jack Cohen, and Zaki Douek, Cairo, to the High Commissioner, Jerusalem, 11 January in Enclosure III Chancellor to Passfield, 17 January 1931.
64. CZA (Central Zionist Archives) J105/32, Protocol, joint meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, the Executive of the *Vaad Le'umi*, members of the *Lishka Meuchedet* and *Agudat Israel*, 21 January 1931, 2.
65. *Al-Jami'a al-Arabiyya*, 14 January 1931, 3.
66. *Do'ar Ha'yom*, Uri Zvi Greenberg, "On Tel-Aviv's Chatterbox," 28 January 1931, 1.
67. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, 17 January 1931, 4.
68. *Ibid.*, 24 January 1931, 1.
69. *Ibid.*, 2.
70. *Davar*, 2 September 1925, 1.
71. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, 24 January 1931.
72. *Ibid.*, 2.
73. *Ibid.*, 2–3.
74. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 18 January 1931, 404.
75. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, 24 January 1931, 3.
76. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 403.
77. Berl Katzenelson was editor of *Davar*. The weekly English edition was edited by Moshe Sharett. Perplexingly, the editorial could not be traced in the English issues of *Davar*. Information about the content of this editorial is limited to references in contemporaneous sources, most notably Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 404; CZA, J105/32, Protocol, 2.
78. *Filastin*, 25 January 1931.
79. *Ibid.*
80. CZA, J105/32, Protocol, 3.
81. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 403.
82. CZA, J105/32, Protocol, 2.
83. *Ibid.*, 1.
84. *Davar*, 21 January 1931, 1.

85. *Ibid.*, 23 January 1931, 1.

86. Established in December 1929, the *Lishka Meuchedet* was put in charge of cultivating and improving relations with the Arabs. It was headed by Kisch, Jewish Agency; Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, *Vaad Leumi*; and Haim Margalioth Kalvarisky. The Public Council of the *Lishka Meuchedet* included Jewish mayors and deputy mayors. On *Agudat Israel* and its cooperation with the Jewish Agency see Yosef Fond, "Into the Circle: Attempts by *Agudat Israel* to cooperate with the Jewish Agency," *Israel* 21 (2013): 143–77 [Hebrew].

87. Pinhas Rutenberg, Head of the *Vaad Leumi*, could not attend, but concurred with Kisch, CZA, J105/32, Protocol, 1.

88. *Ibid.*, 3.

89. *Ibid.*

90. *Davar*, 25 January 1931, 1.

91. *Filastin*, 25 January 1931, 1.

92. Kisch, *Palestine Diary*, 8 February 1931, 409.

93. *Davar*, 8 February 1931, 1.

94. *Ibid.*, January 1931, 1.

95. NAUK, Mr. Perowne report, *Funeral of the late Maulana Mohammed Ali*, Enclosure, Chancellor to Passfield, 24 January 1931.

96. *Davar*, 25 January 1931, 1.

97. *Filastin*, 24 January 1931, 2.

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Davar*, 25 January 1931, 1.

100. *The Palestine Bulletin*, 25 January 1931, 1.

101. *Doar Ha'yon*, 22 January 1931, 1.

102. NAUK, Chancellor to Passfield, 24 January 1931, 2.

103. *Davar*, 11 September 1931, 15.